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ertrand Russell once said ‘There are reading parties and reading parties, and 
they are mainly the latter.’ I take it that Russell wanted to convey that not all 
of the things that pass as reading parties conform to a certain inflated conception 
that one might have of them. Someone of disjunctivist persuasion says that there 
are experiences and experiences. The message then is that not all experiences 
conform to the deflated conception that a philosopher might have of them. Some 
reading parties are constituted of tracts of intellectual excitement, but Russell 
wanted us to know that plenty are not. A proponent of disjunctivism wants us to 
recognize that, despite the fact that some of our experiences might not be 
constituted of facts being manifest to us, plenty actually are. This disjunctivism 
evidently makes a claim in the philosophy of perception. 
What I want to promote here is a different disjunctivism, which belongs in the 
philosophy of action: it concerns acting for reasons. I shall suggest that it can play 
a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell 
recommends in thinking about perception.1 So I say that there are cases and 
cases of acting for reasons; and not all of them conform to the conception that 
philosophers have of them when they think of actions as explained by beliefs and 
desires. When this disjunctivist conception is treated as a sort of counterpart to 
the disjunctive conception of appearances, the two can be shown to have work to 
do in combination. And my hope is that McDowell’s disjunctive conception 
emerges in good standing when it is thought about alongside the disjunctive 
conception of acting for reasons. 
The first thing I have to do is to show that a disjunctive claim about acting for 
reasons makes a point in its own right. I think that we need a view which gives a 
rôle to knowledge. In part 1 of what follows, I motivate and demonstrate the rôle of 
knowledge in acting for reasons, and I show that a disjunction can record its rôle. 
In part 2, I show why this might be a fitting way to record it. It is here that I make 
use of parallels between the two disjunctive conceptions. With the parallels in 
place, I return to questions about acting for reasons: in part 3, I suggest that a 
disjunctive conception safeguards the connection between considerations that 
move us to act in particular ways and considerations that favour our acting in 
particular ways.2 
1 
If you present a philosopher with the question ‘What is a reason for acting?’, then 
you may find you get different answers according as you ask it of a philosopher 
who specializes in ethics or of one who specializes in philosophy of mind. The two 
different answers need to be brought into harmony with one another. A 
satisfactory account of human agency ought to reveal human beings’ capacity to 
act for reasons as an aspect of both their ethical and their psychological nature. 
___________ 
1  McDowell (1982), and subsequent of his writings referred to in the bibliographies of other 
papers in the present volume. (In this context and for my purposes, there will be no need to cite 
chapter and verse.) 
2 Thus I share one of the objectives of Dancy (2000). I respond to things in Dancy’s book in parts 1 
and 3 below, although I have confined mention of specific disagreements to footnotes. 
B
  
 
 
 
2 
And that means that we need an understanding of reasons for acting which suits 
both ethics and philosophy of mind. My claim will be that we start to achieve such 
an understanding, when we see human agents as knowledgeable—when we take 
ourselves to know things. 
The two different answers to ‘What is a reason for acting?’ correspond to two 
conceptions of such reasons (§1.1). I think that the two conceptions can happily 
co-exist, and I shall say something about that at the end of the paper. In the 
present part, I need to say something about how the two conceptions cannot be 
distinguished (§1.2) and something about how they are connected (§1.3). The aim 
is to show that a disjunctivist claim illuminates a connection between them (§1.4). 
1.1 The two conceptions of reasons for acting.  Jonathan Dancy gives expression to 
the idea of a reason for acting as it plays a part in ethics when he says ‘To be a 
reason for action is to stand in a certain relation to action, and the relation .. is 
that of favouring’.  
The idea evidently has application beyond such reasons as one might be 
inclined to think of as ethical ones. Here are some examples. ‘Why is Jill heading 
south? She’s agreed to meet Jack down the road.’ ‘Why are you walking on the 
common? The dog needs a walk.’ ‘Why is Edna skating at the edge of the pond? 
The ice in the middle is very thin.’ In each case, we learn something which can be 
expressed in the language of reasons. The fact that Jill has agreed to meet Jack 
down the road is a reason she has for heading south. The fact that the dog needs 
a walk is a reason you have for walking on the common. And so on. In the 
presence of the relevant facts, one sees that there’s something to be said for some 
agent’s acting in a certain way—for Jill’s heading south, or whatever. One sees 
that a person’ s acting in that way may be favoured. This conception of reasons 
can be set out schematically, thus: 
(F) A reason for X to φ was [the fact] that p. 
What about the philosophers of mind’s conception of a reason for acting? 
Well, many of them endorse a qualified version of a principle sometimes called the 
belief-desire-action principle—a principle which connects psychological states that 
lead to acting in a particular way with acting in that way. It can be stated as 
follows. 
(BDA)  If X desires something and believes that φ-ing will help secure it, then 
X will φ. 
Nobody actually accepts (BDA) as it stands; it obviously needs massive 
qualification. But it can be used to convey the idea that underlies the claims of 
philosophers whom I shall call belief-desire theorists. They say that a belief-desire 
pair which is related to φ-ing in accordance with (BDA) is a reason for φ-ing.3 And 
___________ 
3  This conception of reasons is familiar from Davidson (1963): Davidson said there that a primary 
reason for action consists of a belief and a pro-attitude.  
 When a reason is thought of as a pair of a belief and a desire, reasons are individuated in relation 
to the goals or ends of action (to desired things). According to this mode of individuation, a person 
can properly be said to have ‘more than one’ reason to φ only if they are in a position to satisfy two 
different desires simultaneously by φ-ing (so that someone who had many reasons to φ could kill 
many birds with a single stone). I use ‘a reason’ differently: see next note. 
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they think that such reasons have a place in causal explanations. For illustration, 
take the case of Jill who was heading down the road. The reason Jill had for doing 
so, according to these theorists, is her belief that she’ll find John at the bottom of 
the road combined with a desire to meet John, as agreed; and Jill heads where 
she does because she has this reason. 
Often we mention only someone’s belief in stating a reason they had for 
acting.4 (We might explain Jill’s heading down the road by saying just that she 
thinks that she’ll find John.) Here I’m going to confine myself to what can be 
brought under the head of belief: I shall be concerned only with the cognitive side 
of things.5 So I make use of a notion of reasons which can be summed up with 
schema (B). 
(B) X had a reason to φ: X believed that p. 
(B) can be glossed by saying that beliefs are reasons for acting. And it has to 
be so glossed if the conception of reasons for action which is at work in 
philosophy of mind is to be brought in. But if we do speak of beliefs as reasons, 
then we must be alert to what ‘beliefs’ now means. Many belief-desire theorists 
have a habit of talking as if the beliefs that are reasons for acting were states of 
people’s mind. But in fact it is only relatively rarely that a belief in this sense 
constitutes a reason that someone has. Consider someone whose calling of the 
police is explained when it is said that she believes that she is constantly being 
followed. Her reason for calling the police is not her state of believing that she is 
being followed. The reason she has for calling the police is, as she would tell us, 
that she is being followed—which is something she believes. That this is so 
becomes amply clear if we contrast hers with a different sort of case, now of the 
relatively rare sort. It might be that a man has a reason to go to a doctor because 
he believes that he is constantly being followed: his believing this may be a 
symptom of paranoia. What now favours visiting the doctor—a reason he has for 
doing so—is that he believes that he is being followed. But by and large when 
someone has a reason by dint of believing something, their reason itself is not 
something psychological. Rather, their reason is given, as it is in the more usual 
case of the woman who called the police, when it is said what they believe.6 
We now have the two answers to the question What is a reason for acting? 
Reasons for acting are given when facts are stated: let us call these ‘(F)-type 
reasons’. Reasons for acting are given when it is said what an agent believes: let 
us call these ‘(B)-type reasons’. No special reification of reasons is involved in 
___________ 
4  When we mention only a belief and speak of this as ‘a reason’, the use of ‘a reason’ is such that 
various things are reasons for an agent to φ on occasion, and something counts as a reason by virtue 
of being part of a reason in the sense of the previous note. I adopt this ‘fine-grained’ way of 
speaking of reasons throughout. What we speak of as a reason is much dependent upon contextual 
factors; and when we speak of ‘the reason’, I think we usually mean something which, in context, is 
the most salient reason.  
5  Questions about how much belongs ‘on the cognitive side of things’ would need to be addressed 
in a full account. But I needn’t take sides on this here. In the hopes of showing that I don’t prejudge 
those questions, despite my using (BDA) to arrive at one notion of a reason, I note (a) that the 
‘desire’ of (BDA) can be understood as a generic pro-attitude, and (b) that facts (or beliefs) may 
themselves be reasons for having pro-attitudes of various sorts. 
6  Although this point about what belongs in the category of reasons was made by Parfit (1997) 
(see also e.g. Dancy (2000) and Hyman (2001)), many philosophers of mind still pay no heed to it. 
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using these labels: there is commitment only to there being correct instances of 
the schemas, and to ordinary talk of things that are reasons and of things that 
people believe. In what follows I use the labels ‘(F)-type’ and ‘(B)-type’ regularly. I 
don’t mean to commend the labels except insofar as they can be of use in keeping 
track of the occurrences of ‘reason’ deriving from the two schemas. Usually, of 
course, we just say ‘reason’, and usually it is clear enough what we mean. 
Although (F)-type and (B)-type reasons are introduced here as belonging to 
two different branches of philosophy, each corresponds to a perfectly everyday 
conception. We saw various examples in which we state facts in saying what 
reasons there were. At least as plentiful can be examples in which we say what 
someone believed in saying what reason they had. Suppose that Ann told Sam 
that the café she would meet him at was on Beech Street, although it isn’t there in 
fact. It dawns on Ann that she misinformed Sam. She takes steps to ensure that 
he knows where the café actually is. (Maybe she can reach him on his mobile 
’phone.) Her thinking might be that Sam will soon be on his way to Beech Street: 
inasmuch as Sam believes that Ann will be there, he has a reason to be going 
there. In this example, Sam temporarily has a false belief, and Ann takes him 
therein to have a reason. But one’s belief does not have to be false for one to have 
a (B)-type reason. Even if Sam was right about where the café is, we could still 
adduce his belief about its location in saying what reason he had for being on his 
way to Beech Street. Indeed an onlooker who was ignorant of where the café 
actually is could explain why Sam is headed towards Beech Street by supplying 
Sam’s reason for heading there: Sam believes that the café at which he is meeting 
Ann is on Beech Street. This can be correct whether Sam is right or wrong about 
where the café is. 
When true beliefs are seen to play the same sort of rôle in explanation as false 
ones do, we realize that, according to our ordinary understanding of reasons, (B)-
type reasons are at least as ubiquitous as (F)-type ones. It is not at all surprising 
then that philosophers of mind should work with (B)-type reasons: one seems 
bound to think of beliefs as reasons if one’s aim is to cover the ground with a 
single sweep and to account for action which springs from true and false belief 
alike.  
The ubiquitousness of (B)-type reasons has led some people to speak 
sometimes as if people’s having reasons for acting were (on the cognitive side) only 
ever a matter of their having beliefs. But we could not think of reasons for acting 
as all of the (B)-type. If you believe that the dog needs a walk, there may, or there 
may not, be an (F)-type reason for you to walk on the common. Perhaps 
unbeknownst to you, someone just took the dog for a long walk in the park, so 
that he doesn’t need a walk and there is no reason for you to take him to the 
common now. Here there is a question about what reasons you have which isn’t 
addressed when your (B)-type reasons are all taken into account. 
1.2 Distinguishing between conceptions of reasons.  Endorsing both conceptions of 
reasons for acting might appear to lead to a puzzle. For if we accept that whenever 
someone acts for an (F)-type reason, they act on a true belief, then we have to say 
that whenever there is an (F)-type reason for which a person acts, there is also a 
(B)-type reason for which they act. It could then seem as if someone who acted for 
an (F)-type reason had double the reason to do that which they did for that 
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reason. And that might seem puzzling: are our actions overdetermined somehow 
when we act for reasons? 
Well, we must remember that the label ‘(B)-type reason’ attaches to something 
only inasmuch as an instance of schema (B) is correct. And we have seen that, 
except in the relatively rare cases, someone’s believing something does not provide 
them a reason. (The belief that he was being followed did provide the possibly 
paranoid man with a reason to go to the doctor. But it was not among the reasons 
of the woman who called the police that she believed that she was being followed; 
what provided her with a reason was the fact that she was being followed.) Thus 
(B)-type reasons need not to be thought of as, as it were, additional reasons—
reasons beyond those that might be provided by the facts. Indeed if your belief is 
that things are a certain way, and in fact that things are that way, then what you 
believe (that p, say) can be said to be a fact (it’s a fact that p). Still, this may not 
completely remove the puzzle. For even if there is no need to suppose that you 
might have two reasons for action just in truly believing something, there are 
nonetheless two different accounts of why you act when it is said that you acted 
for an (F)-type reason and that you acted for a (B)-type reason: you acted because 
p, and you acted because you believed that p. 
In due course, we shall see that there really need be no puzzle here. But to be 
going on with, we need to rule out a way of avoiding the supposed puzzle. 
Someone might try to avoid saying that agents have ‘double the reason’ by 
denying that the agent who acts on a belief really has any reason at all for acting. 
Reasons for acting are all of them facts, this person says: when we know of an 
agent’s (B)-type reasons, we simply know reasons why they act as they do; but 
(B)-type reasons are not reasons for which people act. The ‘reason’ of ‘(B)-type 
reason’ is just the ‘reason’ of explanation. 
But this is wrong. Of course (B)-type reasons do figure in reason-why 
explanations: an explanation is given, for instance, when it is said why Sam is 
going to Beech Street. And it is true that if Ann is not in the café on Beech Street, 
then there is actually no reason for Sam to be going there. But that doesn’t show 
that Sam fails to have a reason to go there. The reason Sam has for going there is 
known by the ignorant onlooker, who tells us what reason Sam has in telling us 
what Sam believes. And the explanation given of Sam’s going to Beech Street, 
when it is said what Sam believes, cannot be assimilated to any old reason-why 
explanation. Perhaps the reason why the bridge collapsed was that it had a 
structural flaw. Still, the bridge didn’t have a reason to collapse. The explanation 
of Sam’s behaviour and of the bridge’s collapse are of different kinds: in the sense 
of ‘have a reason’ in which it could be made clear to all that Sam had a reason to 
go to Beech Street, bridges never have reasons to do anything. (Even within the 
class of explanations that adduce psychological facts about X in answering the 
question ‘Why did X φ?’, we distinguish between those in which X’s reasons for φ-
ing are given and those in which they aren’t. ‘Because he believed that she had 
noticed him’ might tell us why he had blushed, for instance, even though there is 
no reason-explanation here: he had no reason to blush.) 
We need then to think of a (B)-type reason as a reason an agent has for φ-ing, 
and not as a reason that there is for φ-ing. This is not to say, however, that a 
reason that there is for φ-ing cannot be a reason an agent has, and indeed a 
reason for which they φ. The crucial point is that the inference from ‘x has a 
reason’ to ‘There is a reason x has’ fails when (B)-type reasons are in question but 
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not when (F)-type reasons are. (This can be the key to understanding why one can 
wind up with the prima facie paradoxical ‘There was no reason to do what he did, 
even though he did it for a reason’. In my terms, this means that there was no (F)-
type reason to do what he did even though his having a (B)-type reason explains 
his doing it.7)  
Sometimes philosophers talk about ‘normative’ reasons and contrast them 
with ‘motivating’ reasons in order to separate the (F)-type from the (B)-type. But 
the label ‘normative’ cannot be an apt one if it is supposed to put reasons of the 
two types into different categories. For normative questions, about the justification 
of action, don’t lapse when one adverts to what the agent believes in saying what 
reason they had. When Ann saw Sam as having the reason which he had by dint 
of his having a false belief about her whereabouts, she treated him as someone 
who acts for reasons. Indeed the normativity which (B)-type reasons share with 
(F)-type ones shows why we do not think of the bridge as having had a reason to 
collapse: the bridges’ behaviour is not subject to the sort of assessment to which 
people’s conduct is. 
When (B)-type reasons are seen to be normative in the manner of (F)-type 
reasons, it seems that they inherit the normativity of (F)-type reasons. We might 
say that if X has a reason to φ in believing that p, then—at least from X’s 
perspective—there would be an (F)-type reason for X to φ if p were true.8 So, for 
example, Sam believed that Ann was in a café on Beech Street, and he would have 
had an actual reason to go to Beech Street if that had been so. Here Sam’s having 
a reason in believing what he does is explained by allusion to (F)-type reasons: 
Sam’s having a reason is understood by reference to the idea that a fact can 
favour a way of acting. 
1.3 Connecting (F)’s instances with (B)’s.  In order to see how the two types of 
reasons for acting are related, we need to think about acting for reasons. We need 
to look into the two different accounts we saw of why someone acts—at two types 
of reason-explanations, that is. These can be represented with schemas. 
(F.Exp) X φ-d because p (where ‘because’ can be glossed with ‘for the  
           reason that’). 
(B.Exp) X φ-d because they believed that p (where X had a reason to φ: 
            they believed that p). 
___________ 
7  Compare Dancy (2000): 3, whose own diagnosis is different. Dancy thinks that the key is to 
recognize that ‘Some motivating reasons are not good reasons.’ He says ‘It is only when we have our 
eyes on the question .. whether there were any good reasons for so acting .. that we want to allow 
that a motivating reason can be no reason at all.’  We can grant to Dancy that ‘There was no reason 
for him to do it’ can be correct when he lacked any remotely good reason to do it (cp. next note). But 
Dancy’s diagnosis does not speak to the case in which (a) he did it because he believed that p, (b) it 
was false that p, (c) it is not question that there would have been a perfectly good reason for him to 
do the thing if it had been that p. 
8  ‘At least from X’s perspective’ has plenty of work to do here. An agent’s having some belief may 
lead them to act in some way, which for all that the belief is true, is actually not a reason—i.e. now 
not a remotely good reason—for so acting. The agent then treats a consideration as favouring φ-ing, 
although it is not genuinely a reason, but can be seen as favouring φ-ing only by adopting their 
perspective on what favours what. A complete account of reasons for acting (which I don’t attempt 
here) would evidently need to speak to these cases. 
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The qualifications here (‘where ..’ ) rule out cases where the ‘because’, of ‘because 
p’ and ’because they believed that p’, is not the ‘because’ of a reason-explanation.9 
The obvious way to make a connection between these two would be to say 
that someone does something because p, if both they do it because they believe 
that p and p is actually a reason for them to do it. Thus: 
(P)   X φ-d because (for the reason that) p if 
(i)  X φ-d because they believed that p, and 
(ii)  A reason for X to φ was that p. 
To see how (P) would work, think about the skater Edna who kept to the edge of 
the pond because the ice in the middle was thin. According to (P), Edna kept to 
the edge of the pond because she believed that the ice in the middle was thin, and 
the fact that the ice there was thin was a reason for her to keep to the edge. 
But (P) cannot be right. What conjunct (i) tells us about the agent—that she 
believed that p—is independent of whether p is true. (Edna could have believed 
that the ice in the middle of the pond was thin, even if it wasn’t.) Conjunct (ii) tells 
us something about a reason for the agent to φ which might obtain without 
registering with the agent. (There might be a reason for Edna to keep to the edge 
of the pond, even if Edna was not aware of it.) But if p was actually someone’s 
reason for φ-ing, then the fact that p was something that registered with them. 
(The fact that the ice in the middle of the pond played a part in keeping Edna at 
the edge of the pond if she stayed at the edge because of the thin ice in the 
middle.) So we can agree that Edna’s believing that the ice was thin ensured that 
she had a reason to keep to the edge (a (B)-type one). And we can agree that the 
thinness of the ice ensures that there was a reason for Edna to keep to the edge 
(an (F)-type one). Still, Edna’s believing what she did cannot as such provide her 
with the actual reason that there was for her to keep to the edge. 
Here now is a counterexample to (P), which will serve not only to bring out 
what is wrong with it, but also to suggest a remedy. The example concerns 
Edmund who believes that the ice in the middle of the pond is dangerously thin, 
having been told so by a normally reliable friend, and who accordingly keeps to 
the edge. But Edmund’s friend didn’t want Edmund to skate in the middle of the 
pond (never mind why), so that he had told Edmund that the ice there was thin 
despite having no view about whether or not it actually was thin. Edmund, then, 
did not keep to the edge because the ice in the middle was thin. Suppose now 
that, as it happened, the ice in the middle of the pond was thin. This makes no 
difference. Edmund still didn’t keep to the edge because the ice was thin. The fact 
that the ice was thin does not explain Edmund’s acting, even though Edmund did 
believe that it was thin, and even though the fact that it was thin actually was a 
reason for him to stay at the edge. 
Edmund is a familiar sort of character in epistemology. Such characters are 
usually used to show that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. 
Edmund here is used to show that someone’s having a true belief (even a justified 
one) which explains their acting is not sufficient for them to have acted for an (F)-
___________ 
9  At this point I have to assume that we know what a reason-explanation is. Notice that even with 
the qualifications written in, cases in which a subject’s believing something is itself a reason (see 
above, where n.6 was flagged) are not excluded: in those cases ‘X believes that ––’ substitutes for ‘p’ 
in (F) and in (B). 
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type reason. We saw that an (F)-type reason has to have registered with an agent 
if they are to have acted on it. We see now what this amounts to. A condition of φ-
ing for the reason that p, when one believes that p, is that one knows that p. 
When people act for (F)-type reasons, they do so in virtue of knowing the relevant 
facts.10 
1.4 A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons.  We wanted to understand how 
the ethicists’ ((F)-type) reasons and the philosophers of mind’s ((B)-type) reasons 
are related. A connection between them is easy to make now that knowledge is on 
the scene. It can be recorded by giving an account of acting for reasons in which 
acting from knowledge belongs under the head of acting from belief—an account 
which might be formulated as follows: 
(DisA)  If X φ-d because X believed that p, then 
 EITHER X φ-d because X knew that p, so that X φ-d because p. 
 OR X φ-d because X merely believed that p. 
Note that all the ‘because’s in (DisA) are to be so understood that (DisA) is 
concerned exclusively with reason-explanations. (Compare the qualifications in 
(F.Exp) and (B.Exp) above. For the sake of simplicity, I don’t write the 
qualifications in explicitly here.) 
‘Merely believed that p’ here has to mean ‘believed that p without knowing 
that p’. And this could make it seem that (DisA) relies on little more than that one 
either knows or doesn’t know the things that one believes. Certainly (DisA), which 
has ‘if’ and not ‘iff’, is no sort of analysis.11 What makes (DisA) less than trivial, 
despite an evident circularity, is the conjunct that belongs in the first disjunct—
that X φ-d because p. Of course it’s a fact that p if X knows that p; but this 
conjunct assures us of more than this: it puts it on record that where there is a 
reason-explanation from X’s knowledge, the fact that p was a reason X had for φ-
ing. 
Thus (DisA) connects reasons of the two types. And it can serve to remind us 
that belief-desire theories lack the resources needed to say what it is to act for an 
(F)-type reason. If we are to say what it is to act for an (F)-type reason, we need 
the idea that knowledge is a spring of action. 
2 
I want to encourage an understanding of (DisA) on which it can complement John 
McDowell’s disjunctive conception of appearances. I am going to assume that a 
disjunctivism of McDowell’s sort is correct and can play the part McDowell gives 
it. My idea is to build upon it, and perhaps, indirectly, to lend it support. If (DisA) 
___________ 
10  For plenty of examples showing that one needs to know (relevant) things to do (related) things 
intentionally, see Gibbons (2001). 
11  To justify replacing the ‘if’ with ‘iff’ I should need at least to justify an assumption (which I take 
it most belief-desire theorists work with) that propositional knowledge requires belief. There are 
reasons to be doubtful about this. And it suits me that there is no need to settle whether the 
assumption is correct: one effect of my not going for ‘iff’ is that it can be very clear that there is no 
pretence at analysis. Something that I hope will emerge from part 2 is that a disjunctivist claim can 
play a dialectical rôle without having analytic pretensions.  
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does good clarificatory work when understood in parallel with McDowell’s 
disjunctive conception, and if an attractive picture results when both disjunctive 
conceptions are in play, then a case of sorts may be made for accepting both. 
I shall present McDowell’s disjunctive conception as a counterpart to (DisA), 
so that we shall have (DisP), with ‘P’ for perception, where ‘A’ was for action. That 
puts me in a position to show that (DisA) can make a point analogous to 
McDowell’s (§2.2). It can then be seen that the two disjunctive conceptions have 
work to do together (§2.3), and an underlying structure can be uncovered (§2.4). 
2.1 The disjunctive conception of appearances as an analogue of (DisA).  McDowell 
wants us to appreciate that someone to whom it appears that things are thus and 
so may actually be someone who perceives how things are. We appreciate this 
when we say that cases in which it appears to a subject that things are thus and 
so come in two kinds—cases of genuine perceptual experience, and cases of mere 
appearance. Cases of the two kinds might be indistinguishable from the point of 
view of the experiencing subject; but this should not interfere with recognizing 
their difference—a difference which becomes evident when it is allowed that it may 
be manifest to a subject in experience that things are thus and so. 
Thus McDowell’s disjunctive conception simultaneously brings together and 
distinguishes the experience of a perceiver and the experience of someone who 
has a mere experience. What the disjunctive conception of acting for reasons does 
is simultaneously to bring together and to distinguish acting from an actual 
reason and acting from mere belief. Cases in which an agent acts because they 
believe that p come in two kinds. Cases of the two kinds might be 
indistinguishable from the point of view of the agent or of an onlooker who is 
ignorant of the relevant facts; but this should not interfere with recognizing their 
difference—a difference which becomes evident when it is allowed that an agent 
may act from knowledge.  
If McDowell’s idea is formulated in parallel with (DisA), then the notion of 
knowledge will enter explicitly into its statement. So we have:12 
(DisP)  It appears to X as if things are thus and so if  
 EITHER it is manifest to X that things are thus and so, so that X  
    is well placed to know how things objectively are.13 
 OR it merely appears to X as if things are thus and so, so that X is  
         not in such a position. 
This formulation highlights the fact that experiences in which things seem a 
certain way to a subject are not all on a par epistemologically speaking. 
Explicitness about this helps to make it clear that a subject’s inability to 
distinguish between experiences of two sorts cannot be adduced in an argument 
purporting to show that their epistemic situation is the same whichever sort their 
experience is of. When an experience is recorded by saying that things are 
___________ 
12  As with (DisA), we have ‘if’ and not ‘iff’. Some might say that this means that Disjunctivism 
proper is then not really at issue. But (DisP) may be worth considering if it can assist in conveying 
the point of adopting a disjunctive conception of appearances. 
13  The qualified ‘well placed to know’ allows for cases in which a subject (perhaps because they 
wrongly suppose that they are under some illusion) fails to take appearances at face value—a 
subject who, arguably, then fails to perceive how things are. 
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manifestly so to its subject, it can be clear that, whatever doubts a sceptic might 
induce in them, the subject, if they judge that things are actually some way, does 
not take a step beyond what their experience entitles them to judge. This at least 
can be clear if X’s being well placed to know how things objectively are is 
constituted by X’s having an experience of the sort they do in satisfying the first 
disjunct. 
2.2 (DisA) as parallel to the disjunctive conception of appearances.  The point so 
far, of (DisA), has been to show that, unless it is to be ruled out that people act for 
(F)-type reasons, it has to be allowed that knowledge sometimes explains people’s 
acting. Some belief-desire theorists may think this of little moment. ‘It can be 
allowed that a person’s knowing something might come into an explanation of 
their doing what they did’, these theorists may say. ‘And when questions about an 
agent’s (F)-type reasons are introduced, we need to ask whether the agent knows 
the things they believe. But this a separate matter—separate from the 
phenomenon which interests us belief-desire theorists.’ 
Knowledge cannot be so easily sidelined, however. Suppose that actually the 
reason for which a person φ-s is that p. (Suppose, for instance, that in fact Sam is 
headed for Beech Street because [for the reason that] Ann is there.) The belief-
desire theorists say that the person φ-s because they believe that p; and their 
explanation can be well and good. (Indeed Sam is headed for Beech Street because 
he believes that Ann is there.) But the person’s acting as they do now depends 
upon their knowledge. (Something that Sam is doing is heading for Beech Street 
because [for the reason that] Ann is there, and unless he knew that she was there, 
he would not be doing this.) The person’s knowing that p is hardly a separate 
matter, then. 
It need not be at all puzzling now that (F)-type and (B)-type reasons should 
play their rôles in concert. I suggested that there could seem to be a puzzle posed 
by asking: ‘Are our actions somehow overdetermined when we act for an (F)-type 
reason and a (B)-type reason?’. Well, the person who acts for a (B)-type reason is 
moved by believing things to be a certain way. If they act also for an (F)-type 
reason, then they are satisfactorily related to how things actually are, and the fact 
that things actually are the way they believe them to be weighs with them. 
Someone who Φ-s because they believe that p may actually be someone who Φ-s 
because p. Compare the claim which I used to introduce (DisP): someone to whom 
it appears that p may actually be someone who perceives that p. 
2.3 The two disjunctive conceptions brought together.  I turn now to an example in 
which perceptual experience leads to action. This is with a view to showing how 
the two disjunctive conceptions—of experience, and of acting for reasons—work 
together. The example consists of a pair of cases.14 
Maja has seen a notice about a child who has lost his pet rabbit in the vicinity 
and wants it returned. She sees a rabbit and acquires the belief that there is a 
rabbit at a certain place, so that she has a reason to run in a certain direction. In 
the other case, Maja again is motivated to catch a rabbit if she sees one, and 
again she arrives at the belief that there is a rabbit at a certain place. But in this 
___________ 
14  The cases illustrate what Scott Sturgeon calls ‘delusive Rational efficacy’ (2000) Ch.1. I treat this 
phenomenon differently from Sturgeon, and speak to our disagreement in n.20 below. 
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case, Maja is hallucinating. Again she runs towards the place, but now it merely 
appears to Maja as if there were a rabbit there. There is an explanation of Maja’s 
running as she does which is common to the two cases. Thus, in both cases: Maja 
comes to believe that there is a rabbit at a certain placed because it appears to her 
as if there were a rabbit there; and she runs in the direction she does because she 
believes that there is a rabbit there. 
No-one need quarrel with this common explanation, which makes use, as 
explanantia, of instances of what occurs on the left-hand-sides of (DisP) and of 
(DisA). But the disjunctive conception of acting for reasons directs us towards 
explanations which introduce an agent’s (F)-type reasons. In the case in which 
Maja sees a rabbit, there is another explanation of her running in the direction 
she does: she runs because a rabbit is present. And when we take perceiving-Maja 
to be acting for this reason, we recognize that there is also another explanation of 
her acquiring her belief. This now is an explanation towards which a disjunctive 
conception of appearances might direct us: Maja believes that a rabbit is present 
because she sees the rabbit there. 
(DisP) and (DisA) do work in tandem here. Given (DisP), beliefs which are got 
through experience are sometimes shaped by the facts. Given (DisA), actions 
which spring from beliefs are sometimes shaped by the facts. When Maja sees a 
rabbit and chases it, the fact that the rabbit is present plays a rôle throughout the 
process: Maja runs because there is a rabbit in her sights. 
2.4 The common structure.  Let me introduce some terminology, in order to set out 
the parallels. Say that a case shows up as ‘good’ when (an instance of) the first 
disjunct of (DisA) or (DisP) is used in its description.15 And say that a case is 
described ‘neutrally’ when (an instance of) the left hand side of (DisA) or (DisP) is 
used. So ‘X φ-d because X believed that p’ and ‘It appears to X as if things are 
thus and so’ give neutral descriptions of cases.16 
We have just seen it to be characteristic of good cases that a distinctive sort of 
reason-explanation is available, one which shows the subject’s or agent’s 
connection with the facts. In the good case, Maja was aware of the fact that a 
rabbit was present, and her acting was then a matter of her responding to this 
fact. When a case is described neutrally, its goodness, supposing it actually to be 
a good one, is not apparent. Perceiving-Maja was suitably related to the facts, but 
is not seen to have been so related when her case is described neutrally. One 
might say that neutral descriptions of good cases suppress some of the truth. 
We saw the limitations of explanations of action which are cast in neutral 
terms. I said that Edna’s believing what she did could not as such provide her 
with the reason that there actually was for her to keep to the edge of the pond. 
___________ 
15  Just as the goodness of a case of X’s φ-ing-because-X-believes-that-p does not consist merely in 
its being true that p, so the goodness of a case of experience does not consist simply in its 
veridicality. One could introduce some tricks, and construct an example in which Maja has a 
veridical hallucination as of a rabbit. Evidently the mere presence of a rabbit does not make for a 
good case. 
16 (DisP) is formulated so as to allow for hallucination. To treat illusions, we should need to 
introduce different sorts and grades of neutrality, as it were. For instance: someone who says ‘The 
book appeared to X to be green’ gives a neutral description in one respect, even while showing X’s 
case to be good so far as his perceiving the book is concerned. Obviously a great deal more would 
need to be said in a worked-out account. 
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The point is that when Edna is said to have acted because she believed 
something, it is left open whether she knew it: there is something else one has to 
know about her in order to know whether she acted for an (F)-type reason. Still, it 
may be true that Edna has acted for an (F)-type reason, even when this is left 
unsaid. If an agent has p as a reason for acting, then (in such circumstances, and 
whatever is said) nothing more than what de facto suffices for their believing that 
p may be needed for them to act for the reason that p. The parallel holds for the 
case of experience. When it is said only that things appeared some way to Maja, it 
is left open whether she perceived things to be that way: there is something else 
one needs to know about her in order to know whether her experience is such as 
to provide her with a reason for acting. Still, it may be true that Maja has seen a 
rabbit, even when this is left unsaid. If it appears to a subject that things are a 
certain way and they perceive them to be that way, then (in such circumstances, 
and whatever is said) nothing more than what de facto suffices for their having the 
experience they do may be needed for them to perceive things to be that way.17 
In philosophy of perception, experience is sometimes thought about in its rôle 
of accounting for beliefs. When it comes to philosophy of action, experience must 
be allowed a rôle in providing reasons for acting. The factivity of experiences can 
then come into view, and there is a new point to conceiving of the good cases as a 
disjunctivist does. From the perspective of an account of agency, veridical 
perceptions are seen as fitted to explanations which have no use for neutral 
terms—to explanations of people’s acting for reasons that there actually are for 
them to act. Meanwhile neutral descriptions of experience are seen as relatively 
lacking in explanatory potential. (The fact that one is prevented from explaining 
very much when only neutral descriptions are available showed up in our needing 
to confine ourselves, when we stuck to the neutral, to descriptions of perceiving-
Maja’s action that can strike us as artificial. For example, we had Maja running ‘in 
a certain direction’, where it would be natural to say that she ran towards the 
rabbit. And of course in a good case, someone in a position to demonstrate the 
rabbit can give an explanation of why she ran towards that rabbit [a demonstrated 
one].)18 
Someone might wonder how explanations in which experiences are neutrally 
described can be supposed to work. The explanation of hallucinating-Maja’s 
___________ 
17  I say ‘may be needed’ because it is arguable that someone doesn’t perceive that p unless she takes 
it at face value that it appears as if p: cp. n.13 above. 
18  Martin points out that, by making appeal to (to put the matter in my terms) features proper to 
good cases which perceptions alone can explain, ‘one can … rebut the challenge that the 
disjunctivist’s conception of sensory experience is guaranteed to be explanatorily redundant’. (2004: 
63–4). The features by reference to which Martin makes the point are the particulars in the subject’s 
environment and their properties. I take the point to have added force when the features in question 
are the facts. My hope then is that (DisA) and (DisP) combine to ensure that the ineluctably 
relational character of perceptual experience is writ large: a person’s involvement with the facts 
about how things outside them are may no longer seem to be a matter simply of how the person 
might be described. 
 There is much more that can be said about explanation in this area, as Martin (2004) and 
subsequent literature show. Relevant are examples, which Williamson has given, which show that 
an agent’s knowing something may belong in an account of their acting which is in one good sense 
the most explanatory powerful account (2000: 62). (I say ‘ in one good sense’ because I think that we 
can have different purposes in explaining someone’s acting, so that explanatoriness might not be 
measured on a single dimension.) 
  
 
 
 
13 
running as she does can also be given in the case of perceiving-Maja, in whose 
case there are other, more illuminating, explanations. But if the explanations that 
are proprietary to good cases tell us more than explanations cast in neutral terms, 
then how can statements cast in neutral terms play the explanatory role that they 
do across the board? 
Well, if we think that it is manifest to perceiving-Maja that a rabbit is present, 
then we may think of hallucinating-Maja as under the illusion that it is manifest 
that a rabbit is present. (Not that a mere appearance always puts someone under 
an illusion. ‘I’m under no illusions’ might be the words of someone who takes 
herself to be hallucinating, and who wants it to be known that she discounts her 
experience. But the hallucinating-Maja of our example, who comes to have a 
reason for acting, does not take herself to be hallucinating.) Now, to someone who 
is under an illusion of its being manifest that p, there seems to be a reason for 
believing that p.19 So hallucinating-Maja is understood when it is known both that 
it seems to her that there is a reason for believing a rabbit to be present, and that 
in acquiring the belief she gains a (B)-type reason upon which she acts. 
Perceiving-Maja, insofar as she is described in neutral terms, can then be exactly 
like hallucinating-Maja and understood in the same way. By virtue of her 
experience, there seems to her too to be a reason for a belief which she acquires 
and acts upon. There is no problem, then, about allowing that the explanatory 
work done when neutral descriptions of experience are given can be done both in 
cases which are not good ones and in cases which are.20  This now is comparable 
to allowing that ‘X φ-d because X believed that p’ can be true both when ‘X φ-d 
because p’ isn’t true and when it is. 
3 
I want it to be clear that there is no fault to be found with either of the two 
conceptions of reasons for acting from which we began. So I return here to the 
agenda of part 1. I said there that a story about acting for reasons ought to have 
room for reasons both of the (F)-type and of the (B)-type. I think that we are now 
in a position to see that such a story really must accommodate them both. It is 
not merely that reasons for acting could not all be of the (B)-type (cp. §1.1), but 
also that our idea of acting for reasons could not be got simply from instances of 
(B.Exp). I suggested that the normativity of (B)-type reasons is inherited from the 
___________ 
19  The ‘seem’ here is not the ‘appear’ I have used in descriptions of sensory states. Its appearing to 
someone that p might not result in their seeming to have a reason to believe that p; whether or not it 
does so result depends (very roughly) upon their mindset—upon whether, for instance, they take 
themself to be under an illusion. 
20  Compare Martin on inherited, or dependent, explanatory potential (2004: 70), and his use of this 
idea in answering the question why properties which make for goodness aren’t screened off.  
 In Sturgeon’s book (2000), Disjunctivism fails as a theory of perception because it fails to provide 
an explanation of what he calls Scene immediacy. Sturgeon, then, will have an objection at this 
point. For here the Scene immediacy of hallucinations is adduced in accounting for their impact on 
belief; the delusive Rational efficacy of hallucinations (to continue with Sturgeon’s terms) is 
explained only indirectly; and there is no account of Scene immediacy itself. Well, I suggest that a 
disjunctive conception of experience can do without the explanatory ambitions of the theory 
Sturgeon seeks. (Perhaps we understand Scene immediacy well enough as soon as we know what 
(DisP) is meant to tell us.) But of course there is more to be said, some of which is said in Sturgeon’s 
contribution to the present volume. 
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normativity of (F)-type reasons (§1.2). And so too, I think, is the cogency of (B)-
type reasons. 
3.1 Explanations from Belief.  I just gave an account of why there should be an 
explanation common to the cases of hallucinating- and perceiving-Maja. The key 
was to find a way to understand Maja’s acquiring a belief which is indifferent to 
the question of whether things are indeed as they appear to her to be. We thought 
of Maja as seeming to have a reason for the relevant belief. In thinking of her thus 
in both cases, we rely upon our grasp of how things appear to be when they 
appear to someone to be the way they are. So the understanding we have of a 
hallucinating subject is rested in our understanding of a perceiving subject. Now 
when it comes to acting for reasons, we start out equipped with a way of 
understanding an agent which is indifferent to questions about how things 
actually are. In finding out what someone believes, we already have a way of 
rendering their acting explicable which is indifferent to such questions. (Ignorant 
onlookers, such as the one we encountered in §1.2, make this clear.) But here 
again we should allow a sort of derivativeness of understanding.  
Often our aim in discovering why a person acted as they did is to reveal the 
favourable light in which they saw what they did. By adopting the perspective of 
the agent, so as to come to know what they treated as a reason, we can answer 
questions about their motivation. We may then arrive at an explanation of their 
acting which says what (B)-type reason they had. And then the question what (F)-
type reasons were in play can lapse. (Compare: if we want only to know how it 
appeared to a subject as if things were, we have no need to be troubled with how 
things actually are in their environment.) Still, when one explains a person’s 
acting by saying what they believe, one relies upon a grasp of what is actually a 
reason for acting, or of what might be treated as such.21 (Compare: when one is 
informed of how it appears to a subject as if things are, one relies upon a grasp of 
how things appear when they appear the way they are.) Thus a distinctive sort of 
explanatory interest is in play when (B)-type reasons are seen to be at work; but 
the understanding achieved by knowing someone’s (B)-type reasons is rested in an 
understanding of the operation of (F)-type reasons. 
The point here might be put by saying that (B)-type reasons inherit the 
explanatory character of (F)-type reasons. The point of the disjunctive conception 
of acting for reasons, meanwhile, is that acting for (F)-type reasons can be brought 
under the head of acting for (B)-type reasons. It then seems that reason-
explanations on the patterns of (F.Exp) [‘because p’] and of (B.Exp) 
[‘because x believed that p’] must stand or fall together. 
Let me finish by addressing in turn those who are dismissive of (F)-type 
reasons, and those who are dismissive of (B)-type reasons. 
3.2 Acting for reasons. Belief-desire theorists who take belief to exhaust the 
cognitive states of mind needed in an account of acting for reasons have no place 
for instances of (F.Exp) in their account. (They may say that they are concerned 
with ‘motivating’ reasons, not with ‘normative' ones (see §1.2). And they may think 
that knowledge can be sidelined (see §2.2).) Well, (F)-type reasons are given a 
place in an account when acting for reasons is conceived disjunctively. And the 
___________ 
21  N.8 above touches on the idea of ‘treating’ something as a reason. 
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fact that (B)-type reasons inherit their cogency from (F)-type reasons shows that 
(F)-type reasons can hardly be left out of account. To leave them out would be to 
forget that the understanding achieved by knowing someone’s (B)-type reasons is 
rested in an understanding of the operation of (F)-type reasons. 
Most of these belief-desire theorists, who think that an account of acting for 
reasons can make do with belief alone on the cognitive side, treat instances of 
(B.Exp) as belonging in a naturalistic account of the world’s causal workings. But 
if instances of (B.Exp) are found illuminating only insofar as instances of (F.Exp) 
can be appreciated, then it is very far from obvious that instances of (B.Exp) are 
so much as concerned with the causal workings of the world at large.22 It may be 
then that the dismissal of (F.Exp) on the part of these theorists leads them to an 
erroneously naturalistic view of human agency. Or again, if these theorists adopt 
a naturalistic outlook from the outset, then they are predisposed to keep out of 
sight the idea which (DisA) brings into view—the idea of reasons’ being at work. 
Their adherence to a kind of naturalism encumbers them with a conception of 
people’s reasons for acting which loses any connection with the normative 
contexts in which the concept of reason belongs. 
So much for those who would hope to make do without (F)-type reasons in an 
account of human agency. Recently there has been much suspicion of (B)-type 
reasons. Some say that the whole idea of a (B)-type reason is misguided.23 Some 
say that a proper account of agency should make no appeal to the causal rôle of 
psychological states.24 And some say that although it might appear that we 
explain people’s acting when we say what they believed, if we then give reason-
explanations, these cannot be genuine explanations of such a sort as causal 
explanations are.25 All of these philosophers are hostile to the conception of 
reasons for acting that holds sway in philosophy of mind. It could be that some of 
their hostility is misplaced hostility to the naturalistic view of human agency I 
have just mentioned. But whatever the source of their wishing to make do with a 
conception of acting for reasons which leaves out instances of (B.Exp),26 these 
philosophers face a problem. They fully appreciate the need to accommodate (F)-
type reasons in an account of agency. And they think that in the face of (F)-type 
reasons, (B)-type reasons lose out. But given a conception of acting for reasons in 
which an understanding of (B.Exp) is rested in an understanding of (F.Exp), and 
in which (B.Exp) subsumes (F.Exp), (B)-type reasons could hardly lose out to (F)-
type ones. 
___________ 
22  ‘Very far from obvious’ puts it very mildly in my own view. For arguments against thinking that 
reason-explanations draw on naturalistic causal truths, see Hornsby 1993. 
23  E.g. Stoutland (forthcoming). 
24  E.g. Stout (2004).  
25  E.g. Dancy (2000). 
26  Some of the argument of  §1.1 above was aimed against denying, what Stoutland and Stout 
deny, that one can say what reason someone had in saying what they believe.  
 I surmise that Dancy thinks that anyone who claims that reason-explanation is causal means to 
make appeal to a feature of reasons’ cogency that is not already in evidence when it is known that 
someone’s having a reason to do something has led them to do it. Thus Dancy seems to me to buy 
into an assumption of (though not the view of) those belief-desire theorists who take the idea that 
reason-explanation is causal to be part and parcel of treating instances of (B.Exp) as belonging 
within a naturalistic account of the world’s causal workings. 
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If the argument here is right, both conceptions of reasons must be admitted. 
And a naturalistic view of human agency must not be allowed to stand in the way 
of endorsing them both. With knowledge in the picture, there can be a story of the 
kind we sought in attempting to combine the ethicists’ and philosophers of mind’s 
conceptions—a story in which the normative and the psychological come 
together.27 
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27  To Adrian Haddock, Guy Longworth and Scott Sturgeon, I owe thanks. All of them gave me 
useful comments on, and discussed with me, drafts of material here. To Adrian, I owe double 
thanks: he was the commentator for my paper at the Glasgow conference when he set me straight on 
something crucial, and he has helped at every stage since.  
 To Jonathan Dancy, I owe an apology. I’ve rewritten my paper even since I gave him what I then 
took to be the final version. I hope that there will be another occasion when my delays won’t 
prevent us from engaging with one another. 
